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This paper looks at the predictions of a standard heterogeneous ﬁrm model regarding the
exports of ﬁrms across markets in response to a particular trade policy “experiment” and
c o m p a r e st h e s ep r e d i c t i o n st ot h ed a t a .Au n i q u ef e a t u r eo fo u rd a t ai st h a ti th a si n f o r m a t i o n
on the exports of the same ﬁrm to diﬀerent markets which allows us to look for a new set
of predictions of such models. We argue that while certain predictions seem consistent with
the data, others are not. We then describe the patterns found in the data and argue that
ﬁrm and market speciﬁc demand shocks help explain a number of these anomalies. These
parsimoniously capture factors, like business contacts or networks, or even fashion shocks,
that make buyers more attracted to one ﬁrm rather than another in a particular market.
IA N a t u r a l P o l i c y E x p e r i m e n t
The apparel sector in Bangladesh has two sub-sectors: garments made from woven cloth, and
those made from non-woven material, namely, sweaters and knitwear. These diﬀer in terms
of the “eﬀective” trade policy put on them by the US and EU which are Bangladesh’s main
markets. The EU had an MFN tariﬀ rate of 12-15% on the various categories of apparel
with GSP preferences of 20%. But under the “Everything-But-Arms” (EBA) initiative
implemented in 2001, Bangladesh had access to the EU, duty and quota free, provided
that the rules of origin (ROOs) were satisﬁed. However, these ROOs were restrictive: for
origin to be granted, the product had to start its local manufacturing process from yarn so
that the use of imported cloth was precluded.1 T h eU S ,o nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,h a dt a r i ﬀso f
about 20%, as well as quota restrictions in place on Bangladesh, but origin was granted as
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1See Svetlana Demidova, Hiau Looi Kee and Kala Krishna (2006) for more on this natural experiment.
1long as the product was assembled in Bangladesh. Thus, imported cloth could be used when
exporting to the US.
These ROOs have very diﬀerent implications for the non-woven and woven garments.
Due to current production techniques, non-woven (NW) ﬁrms are able to easily manufacture
garments from yarn and domestic yarn is abundant. But woven (W) ﬁrms need to use
domestic cloth, which commands a premium price, to obtain origin and meeting ROOs
raises costs by about as much as the tariﬀ. In a nutshell therefore, EU eﬀective trade policy
is slightly less restrictive than that of the US in wovens, but is much less restrictive in
nonwovens. This is our natural experiment.
II Implications of a Heterogeneous Firm Model
Firms make varieties of a good which enter utility in a symmetric manner. However, they
have diﬀerent productivities, and hence, diﬀerent constant marginal costs of production. In
such models, more restrictive trade policy makes the market tougher for a ﬁrm exporting to
it for two reasons. First, there is the direct eﬀe c to fm o r ep r o t e c t i o nw h i c hr e d u c e saﬁrm’s
proﬁts. Second, there is an indirect eﬀect via the equilibrium aggregate price index in the
market. Marc Melitz and Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano (2005) show that in such models, as long
as the ﬁxed cost of exporting is large so that only the more productive ﬁrms export, a fact
borne out in a number of studies, a more protectionist stance increases the market potential
of a country and results in more ﬁrms locating there, more varieties competing with each
other, and hence, a lower price index. But a lower price index means more competition and
lower proﬁts. Thus, more restrictive trade policy in a market results in lower proﬁts to a
ﬁrms exporting to it via both channels.2
Assuming that the US and EU are otherwise similar, this yields the result that proﬁts to
Bangladeshi ﬁr m sf r o me x p o r t i n gt ot h eU Ss h o u l db el o w e rt h a nt h o s ef r o me x p o r t i n gt o
2Some evidence that this occurs in the data can be found in Imbs et. al. (2006) who show that for
EU countries, trade openness seems to exert a competitive eﬀect in the short run, with prices and markups
falling. However, these eﬀects diminish, and may even be reversed, in the longer run as more protected
economies attract entry.
2Figure 1: Composition of ﬁrms by export destinations













the EU (as the EU trade policy is more lax). As a result, the minimum productivity required
to survive in the US should be higher than that for the EU, especially in nonwovens where
their trade policy stand diﬀers by more. Productivity, thus, provides a natural hierarchy of
ﬁrms, with more productive ﬁrms being able to export to increasingly tougher markets.
AT h e D a t a a n d t h e P r e d i c t i o n s
Next we look at the data we have, the predictions the standard model delivers for our natural
experiment, and how the predictions ﬁt with our data. We conduct our analysis based on a
complete customs data set of Bangladeshi garment exporters. This data set consists on all
ﬁrms exporting in 2004, with information on their total value and volume of export by the
major markets, namely, the EU and the US. There are a total of 2387 ﬁrms, of which 2211
export to the EU, the US or both. By matching these ﬁrms to the garment ﬁrm directory
in 2004, we were able to identify the industry origins of 1997 ﬁrms.
The model sketched above makes the following predictions:
1. As the EU is an easier market, especially in nonwovens, the fraction of ﬁrms in
Bangladesh that export only to the EU (OEU ﬁrms) in nonwovens should exceed that in
wovens while the reverse should be the case for ﬁr m st h a ta l s oe x p o r tt ot h eU S( A U Sﬁrms).
This prediction is consistent with our data. From Figure 1 it is clear that the fraction of
OEU ﬁrms in nonwovens (≈ 75%) exceeds that in wovens (≈ 53%). The fraction of AUS
ﬁrms in nonwovens (≈ 22%)i ss m a l l e rt h a ni nw o v e n s( ≈ 28%).
3Figure 2: Market shares of ﬁrms by export destinations
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2. OEU ﬁrms should have smaller average market shares in the EU than AUS ﬁrms,
especially in nonwovens, since OEU ﬁrms should be less productive than AUS ones, especially
in nonwovens, and as market shares are higher for more productive ﬁrms. Figure 2 shows
that, as predicted, the average market share of OEU ﬁrms is smaller than the average market
share (in both the US and EU) of AUS ﬁrms, and this is more pronounced in nonwovens.
3. If a ﬁrm sells to the US it must also sell to the EU as the US is the tougher market.
There can be no ﬁrms selling only to the US (OUS ﬁrms).3 Here the data is clearly at odds
with the theory. In both industries together a small fraction of ﬁrms export only to the US.4
T h i sm i g h tb ec l a s s i ﬁed as error, except for the fact that these ﬁrms are very diﬀerent from
the remainder. The average market share of ﬁr m st h a to n l ye x p o r tt ot h eU Si nF i g u r e2
is an order of magnitude higher than that of the others, which would be a sign that they
are very productive in the standard model, and which makes their not exporting to the EU
even more of a puzzle! It is worth pointing out that the fraction OUS ﬁr m si sf a rs m a l l e r
and their share is much larger in nonwovens than in wovens.
4. As market share is increasing in productivity, which is ﬁrm speciﬁc, ﬁrms that sell
t ob o t hm a r k e t ss h o u l dh a v em a r k e ts h a r e si nt h et w om a r k e t st h a ta r es t r o n g l yp o s i t i v e l y
correlated. Consider the group of 548 ﬁrms that export to both the EU and the US in both
industries. Let sE
ij be the market share of ﬁrm i in the EU in industry j, while sU
ij is the
3This result is similar to Mark J. Melitz (2003), where all exporters must also sell in the domestic market,
given that the cutoﬀ productivity for exporting is higher.
4Jonathan Eaton, Samuel Kortum and Francis Kramarz (2004) have a similar ﬁnding: while more pro-
ductive ﬁrms tend to export to more markets, a strict heirarchy does not emerge.
4Figure 3: Unit values of ﬁrms by export destinations
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market share of the same ﬁrm in the US. This market share is relative to Bangladeshi exports
to the country in question. The model predicts that the log of the market shares of ﬁrm i
in both markets are positively correlated.5 Let
(1) lns
E
ij = Dj + β lns
U
ij,j= {NW,W}.
The data clearly rejects this prediction. Not only is β not close to one, it is not even
statistically diﬀerent from zero. The estimated elasticity is 0.02 with a robust standard error
of 0.04. Similar results are obtained when we run the regression separately by industries.
5. Since higher cost (lower productivity) ﬁrms can remain exporters to the EU, and as
higher costs translate into higher prices, the price of OEU exporters should also be higher
than that of AUS ones. This is not borne out in the data. Figure 3 plots the mean unit
value of OEU ﬁrms, OUS ﬁrms, and AUS ﬁr m s( h e r et h eu n i tv a l u ef o rU Se x p o r t si sg i v e n
separately from the unit value of EU exports) in both wovens and nonwovens. The unit
value of ﬁrms that export to the EU is slightly less than the unit value of EU exports of
those ﬁrms that also export to the US, and this is less than the unit value of ﬁrms that
e x p o r to n l yt ot h eU S ,w h i c hi nt u r ni sl e s st h a nt h eu n i tv a l u eo fU Se x p o r t so ft h o s e
ﬁrms that also export to the EU. This pattern is the same for both wovens and nonwovens,
though these diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant. An alternative explanation for more
productive ﬁrms charging a higher price, namely they produce a higher quality good, is worth
5In the standard Marc J. Melitz (2003) framework it predicts that the coeﬃcient β below should be unity.
5considering. Firm quality, like its productivity, is likely to be common across all the market
served by a ﬁrm (as noted by Richard Baldwin and James Harrigan, 2007). If this were an
important reason for unit values to vary, then we would expect that for AUS ﬁrms, their
price in the EU market would be positively correlated with their prices in the US market.
We regress the log of unit value in the EU market on the log of unit value in the US market
for these ﬁrms, controlling for industry-year speciﬁce ﬀects. The partial correlation between
the two prices is not statistically signiﬁcant, with a point estimate of 0.069 and a robust
standard error of 0.044.
What could explain these facts? Below, we argue that ﬁrm and market speciﬁcs h o c k s
can provide such an explanation.
III Demand Shocks
In what follows, we will look at the implications of the EU being an easier market than the
US for Bangladeshi ﬁrms, assuming that everything else is the same in the two countries,
and focusing on the price charged, p, productivity, φ, and demand shock, μ. The demand for
a ﬁrm with shock μ is q(p,μ), with qμ (p,μ) > 0. Both additive demand shocks q(p)+μ,o r
multiplicative ones, q(p)μ, are consistent with this speciﬁcation. The proﬁts of a ﬁrms with
demand shock μ and productivity φ are given by
π(p,φ,μ)=[ p − c(φ)]q(p,μ) − f.
The proﬁt maximizing price, p(φ,μ), is given by the p that solves πp(p,φ,μ)=0 . Let
π(p(φ,μ),φ,μ)=[ p(φ,μ) − c(φ)][q(p(φ,μ),μ)] − f
be the maximized value of proﬁts of the ﬁrm with (ﬁrm and market speciﬁc) demand shock
μ, where p(φ,μ) is the proﬁt maximizing price for such a ﬁrm.
Note that πpp(p,φ,μ) < 0 by the second order conditions for a maximum, and πpμ(p,φ,μ) is
positive if demand shocks are additive but zero if they are multiplicative. Some simple com-




























parative statics results follow from these observations. First, ﬁrms with positive demand
shocks charge higher prices if demand shocks are additive (since such shocks make demand
less elastic) but the same prices if demand shocks are multiplicative (as such a shock re-
sults in a monotonic transformation of proﬁts) while ﬁrms with a higher productivity always
charge lower prices.
Second, assuming demand is positive, a positive demand shock raises sales, and hence,
market share of the ﬁrm if demand shocks are multiplicative. If demand shocks are additive,







The ﬁrst term above is zero if shocks are multiplicative, and as the second term is always
positive, the result follows. If shocks are additive, the ﬁr s tt e r mi sn e g a t i v ef r o mR e s u l t1
and works against the second term.
Third, a positive demand shock or a higher productivity raises the maximized value of
proﬁt s .T h i sf o l l o w sf r o mt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m .A sﬁrms with proﬁts high enough to cover
ﬁxed costs of exporting choose to export, the export productivity cutoﬀ f a l l sa st h ed e m a n d
shock rises. This is depicted in Figure 4 where the demand shocks in the US and EU are
both depicted on the horizontal axis and productivity is on the vertical one. The cutoﬀsf o r
7exporting to the US are depicted by a downward sloping locus. Even less productive ﬁrms
can aﬀord to export to the tougher US market if they have a good enough demand shock.
This locus is drawn to be linear but need not be.6 The cutoﬀ l o c u sf o re x p o r t i n gt ot h eE U
lies inside that for exporting to the US as the EU is the easier market.
It follows that for the same demand shock in both markets, ﬁrms that export to the
US, which is the tougher market (whether as AUS or OUS ﬁrms), have higher productivity
than those that export to the EU, and so have lower prices. For a given productivity, and
a s s u m i n gt h a tt h ed e m a n ds h o c k sf o rt h eU Sa n dE Ua r ed r a w nf r o mt h es a m ed i s t r i b u t i o n ,
ﬁr m st h a te x p o r tt ot h eU S( w h e t h e ra sA U So rO U Sﬁrms) have higher US demand shocks
than the EU demand shocks of those ﬁr m st h a te x p o r tt ot h eE U( w h e t h e ra sO E Uo rA U S
ﬁrms). This follows from the cutoﬀ locus for the EU being inside that for the US as depicted
in Figure 4 since the US is the tougher market. Of course, the distance between the loci is
smaller for wovens than nonwovens since the trade policy stance of the EU is much more
liberal than that of the US in non wovens.
I V T h eE v i d e n c eR e v i s i t e d
What does the augmented model with demand shocks predict, and are these predictions
consistent with the evidence?
Predictions 1 and 2: Though the evidence is consistent with Predictions 1 and 2, these
predictions need not hold due to the trade oﬀ between productivity and demand shocks in
determining the export destinations of ﬁrms. For example, it is possible, without controlling
for demand shocks, for the productivity of OEU exporters to exceed that of AUS ﬁrms
if the US demand shocks of the AUS ﬁrms are large enough to compensate for their low
p r o d u c t i v i t y .F o rt h es a m er e a s o n ,t h ea v e r a g em a r k e ts h a r eo fO E Uﬁrms could exceed that
of AUS ﬁrms.
6For example, if demand shocks are multiplicative and preferences are CES, then this locus cannot
intersect the axes. This follows from the observation that no matter what the productivity, and hence, cost,
there will be some demand for each good when preferences take a CES form. However, if demand shocks are
additive, this need not be the case.
8Suppose, for example, that there are only high productivity ﬁrms and low productivity
ones, with the former tending to receive low demand shocks, while the latter tending to
receive high demand shocks.7 In Figure 4, let the demand shocks in the US and EU for high
productivity ﬁrms be clustered in the region around A while those for low productivity ﬁrms
be clustered near B. Then both high and low productivity ﬁrms will export to the EU, but
only low productivity ﬁrms will tend to have demand shocks high enough to export to the
US. Note that the productivity of OEU exporters could easily exceed that of AUS ﬁrms if
we do not control for demand shocks. Also, the average market shares of OEU ﬁrms need
not be less than that of AUS ones since the greater productivity of the former raises their
share, but their lower demand shock reduces it, so that the net eﬀect is ambiguous.8
Prediction 3: With two dimensions of heterogeneity, it is possible for a ﬁrm to export
to the US and not to the EU. In Figure 4, take a ﬁrm with productivity U and draw a
horizontal line at this level. This line intersects the EU cutoﬀ l o c u sa tFa n dt h eU So n ea t
G. If this ﬁrm gets a demand shock in the US above (below) G, then it will (will not) export
to the US. Similarly, if this ﬁrm gets a demand shock in the EU above (below) F, then it
will (will not) export to the EU. Thus, if it gets a bad demand shock (one that is below F)
in the EU and a good demand shock (one that is above G) in the US, it will export to the
US but not to the EU.
Does the augmented model oﬀer anything else to look for in the data? For a ﬁrm to
export only to the US it needs to have a demand shock in the US that is large enough and
a demand shock in the EU that is small enough. The less restrictive trade policy is in the
EU, or the more restrictive trade policy is in the US, the less likely this is to happen. Thus,
this outcome will be more likely in wovens than in nonwovens. Consistent with this, in the
data, the fraction of ﬁr m si nn o n w o v e n st h a te x p o r to n l yt ot h eU Si sm u c hs m a l l e r( 2 . 1 % )
than the fraction of ﬁr m si nw o v e n st h a td os o( 1 9 % ) .
7This could happen, for example, in a transition country. Low productivity ﬁrms in transition countries
are old ﬁrms. However, they have access to a good network of buyers, and so tend to have better demand
shocks than new entrants who have higher productivity.
8Loosely speaking, predictions 1 and 2 will tend to hold if productivities and demand shocks are positively
correlated, or if most of the variation is in productivities, rather than demand shocks.
9Moreover, as higher demand shocks result in larger market shares, the market share of
OUS exporters should be higher than that of others, especially in nonwovens, where OEU
ﬁrms need to have far more positive demand shocks in the US than in the EU. Consistent
with this, the distribution of market shares in nonwovens of OUS ﬁrms is far to the right of
that for OEU ﬁrms with a mean of 1.3% versus 0.01%.9 The distribution of market shares
in wovens is much closer together. The mean market share for ﬁr m st h a to n l ye x p o r tt ot h e
EU is 0.1%, while that of ﬁr m so n l ye x p o r t i n gt ot h eU Si s0 . 2 % ,o ra b o u td o u b l e .
Prediction 4: With demand shocks, it is no longer necessary for larger market shares
to reﬂect higher productivity or for the market shares of ﬁr m st h a te x p o r tt ob o t hEU
and US to be strongly positively correlated, as market shares could be higher because of
better demand shocks. By omitting the relative US demand shock in (1), which is positively
correlated with the US market share and negatively correlated with the EU market share, the
least square estimate is biased toward zero which could explain our ﬁndings in this regard.
In the absence of capacity constraints, market shares in one market should be independent
of demand shocks in the other, but with capacity constraints, market shares across markets
would be negatively correlated and larger capacity associated with serving more markets.10
Suppose capacity constraints make marginal costs vertical when they become binding. A
ﬁrm would then look at the horizontal sum of its demands in the two markets and equate
the marginal revenue associated with this total demand curve to marginal costs. Given
productivity, a ﬁrm with a larger capacity would be more likely to sell to both markets
and a better relative demand shock in one market would raise a ﬁrm’s market share in that
market while reducing it in the other one. This would provide another source of downward
bias in β.
Prediction 5:O E U ﬁrms have lower demand shocks as well as productivities. The
former predicts higher prices for them, but the latter predicts lower prices if demand shocks
a r ea d d i t i v e .T h eu n i tv a l u e so fO E Uﬁrms being lower than the unit value of EU exports of
AUS ﬁrms is consistent with the latter eﬀect dominating and the unit values of OUS ﬁrms
9All the mean values are calculated after removing outliers at the tail ends of the distributions.
10This might provide a new test for the existence of capacity constraints in such models.
10exceeding those of other ﬁrms is consistent with their having more positive demand shocks.
V Conclusions
Firm heterogeneity is likely to be multifaceted, with ﬁrm and market speciﬁcd e m a n ds h o c k s
playing a prominent role. We provide supporting evidence for the importance of demand
s h o c k sl o o k i n ga tu n i tv a l u e sa n dt h em a r k e ts h a r e so fa l le x p o r t e r su s i n gac o m p l e t ec u s t o m
data of these exporters. We cannot estimate TFP for these ﬁrms, but by looking at the data
on market shares and unit values, we paint a picture that is inconsistent with heterogeneity
in productivity alone and much more in line with both demand shocks and productivity
being important.
Recognizing the importance of ﬁrm demand shocks has several important implications
for work in this area. First, it implies that the standard approach taken of estimating
ﬁrm productivity ignoring demand shocks is likely to produce biased estimates and any
subsequent analysis based on such estimates may not be meaningful. In the revised version
of Demidova, Kee and Krishna (2006), we address these estimation issues in detail and are
also able to back out estimates of these market speciﬁc demand shocks. Second, one can
interpret demand shocks in a static model in terms of access to a network of buyers in a
market. This would make such shocks persistent but market speciﬁc( c o m p a r e dt oﬁrm
speciﬁc productivity shocks which are common across markets). Small young ﬁrms would
tend to have lower access to such a network and so have less persistent shocks. This could
help explain why exporter status changes so often for such ﬁr m s ,w h i l ei ti sm o r ep e r m a n e n t
for older ﬁrms as documented by Jonathan Eaton et. al. (2008). Third, trade liberalization
will move resources from the less productive ﬁrms to more productive ones and from ﬁrms
with unfavorable demand shocks to those that have favorable ones. If these two are positively
correlated, then gains from trade may be larger than in the absence of demand shocks, while
if they are negatively correlated, as may well be the case in transition countries or countries
with an old, ineﬃcient, but well connected public sector, they could be smaller.
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